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23 January 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF



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Laos: [Statements made by Boun Oum and General Phoumi in Bangkok on 21 January, while en route home to Laos from Geneva, confirm that the Vientiane leaders are unreconciled to a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma. In a discussion with Ambassador Young, Phoumi and Boun Oum reiterated their argument of inevitable disaster for Laos if Souvanna were made premier and the defense and interior posts were assigned to his neutralist supporters. Thai Premier Sarit, who was also present, vigorously supported this view and encouraged Phoumi's intransigence. Phoumi made it clear that he would not yield these key posts, and explained his tentative agreement at Geneva as merely wishing to appear reasonable.]

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Cambodia - South Vietnam: The Cambodian Foreign Ministry has charged that two fighter planes from South Vietnam attacked a Cambodian border village on the morning of 21 January. According to a Foreign Ministry note, delivered to the American Embassy before dawn on 22 January, one villager was killed, three were wounded, and material damage was inflicted by rocket fire. Foreign correspondents, International Control Commission representatives, the American army attaché, and officials of the South Vietnamese Government were flown to the scene. [redacted]

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\*Following the army attaché's investigation, the US Embassy reported that all evidence indicates that the attack did in fact come from South Vietnam. The embassy believes Cambodia is "bound to react vigorously," although the situation might be eased if South Vietnam made prompt amends. Saigon has been conducting strikes against Viet Cong targets on its side of the border, and may offer an explanation to the effect that the 21 January incident was the result of an inadvertent crossing of the border. [redacted]

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East Germany: An East German radiobroadcast indicates that a compulsory military service law will be given a combined first and second reading during the Peoples Chamber of Deputies

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meeting scheduled for 24 January. This would be considered tantamount to enactment of the measure. Introduction of compulsory military service, aside from permitting the orderly induction of manpower into the East German forces, would at this time be a further demonstration of "national sovereignty" by the Pankow regime.

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
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Yugoslavia-Albania: [Belgrade has responded favorably to a recent Albanian proposal to negotiate a trade protocol for 1962, according to a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official. This proposal is part of a general campaign by Tirana to expand its relations with the nonbloc world. Belgrade, while not expecting any marked increase over last year's unofficial exchange--about \$200,000--wishes to increase its contacts with Albania and reportedly also has sent a first secretary to its legation in Tirana.]

[Heretofore, Tirana, like Peiping, has held relations with Yugoslavia to a minimum. Last year, when Yugoslavia negotiated five-year trade agreements and protocols for 1961 with the Soviet bloc states, negotiations were not attempted with Tirana and Peiping. Yugoslav and Albanian diplomatic missions were each reduced to three men almost a year ago.]

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Iran: [A demonstration on 21 January in Tehran by anti-government university students, called to protest the expulsion of four secondary-school students, snowballed into the most violent riots of the past two years. Police, gendarmerie, and]

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paratroopers brought the rioting under control after heavy damage was caused both on and off the university grounds. It is not clear whether the unusual entry onto the campus by the police and military was officially sanctioned. Prime Minister Amini has warned students in the past that they would be permitted to demonstrate only on the university campus. The major opposition group, the National Front, probably did not organize the demonstrations, but now may have difficulty in controlling the extremist element who favor more militant action against the government.

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Tanganyika: Julius Nyerere's resignation from the Tanganyika premiership brings into the open the struggle between moderates and extremists in the government and in Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The immediate causes of the resignation apparently were extremist demands for the expulsion from the country of Europeans accused of racial discrimination and for immediate "Africanization" of the civil service. Other issues, such as a long-simmering dispute between the government and the labor movement and popular dissatisfaction with the immediate results of independence, probably were contributing factors. Rashidi Kawawa, deputy premier and generally regarded as Nyerere's most loyal lieutenant, has been named premier--a possible indication that the radicals were unable or unwilling to force a showdown. Other than Nyerere, however, there is no one in TANU able to halt a gradual drift toward extremism.

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Tanganyika Prime Minister Nyerere Resigns

Nyerere told the diplomatic corps on 22 January that his resignation was his own decision. He said he would continue as president of TANU to "prepare the country for economic development." The American chargé in Dar es Salaam is not convinced that Nyerere's decision is his own, however. Earlier reports available to the embassy had indicated that at a TANU national executive conference last weekend the extremists, led by Education Minister Oscar Kambona, had tried to force Nyerere to shift Kambona to the Home Affairs Ministry, which controls the police. The radicals reportedly also urged the removal of Sir Ernest Vasey, Tanganyika's able, British-born finance minister. The chargé said these changes were now certain, and he interpreted them as a defeat for Nyerere. According to the press, Kambona was named to the Home Affairs Ministry yesterday, and Vasey was replaced as finance minister but will stay on as a government adviser.

Kambona, who for years was Nyerere's second-in-command in TANU, is said to be the leader of those who advocate the expulsion of Europeans considered hostile to African interests. At least five whites have been ordered deported so far, and Kambona is reported to have a list of European candidates for expulsion totaling 87. This drift toward racism is likely to affect not only Europeans but Asians, who live in closer contact with the Africans and thus are more vulnerable to pressure and intimidation.

The political struggle is complicated by economic and labor factors. Drought and floods in northern and eastern Tanganyika have drastically reduced the government's revenue, at a time when the unsophisticated populace, disappointed by the economic problems independence has brought, is beginning to call for greater expenditure. At the same time, opposition to TANU in general and to Nyerere in particular from the Tanganyika Federation of Labor is steadily becoming more effective. Even if Nyerere should come out on top in the current political struggle, therefore, the growing strength of the forces opposing him makes it unlikely that his control over the radicals will be as strong as it has been heretofore. [REDACTED]

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